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Abstract
In this paper we propose a class of propagation models for multiple competing products over a social
network. We consider two propagation mechanisms: social conversion and self conversion, corresponding,
respectively, to endogenous and exogenous factors. A novel concept, the product-conversion graph, is
proposed to characterize the interplay among competing products. According to the chronological order
of social and self conversions, we develop two Markov-chain models and, based on the independence
approximation, we approximate them with two respective difference equations systems. Theoretical
analysis on these two approximation models reveals the dependency of the systems’ asymptotic behavior
on the structures of both the product-conversion graph and the social network, as well as the initial
condition. In addition to the theoretical work, accuracy of the independence approximation and the
asymptotic behavior of the Markov-chain model are investigated via numerical analysis, for the case
where social conversion occurs before self conversion. Finally, we propose a class of multi-player and multi-
stage competitive propagation games and discuss the seeding-quality trade-off, as well as the allocation
of seeding resources among the individuals. We investigate the unique Nash equilibrium at each stage
and analyze the system’s behavior when every player is adopting the policy at the Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: competitive propagation, independence approximation, network structure, stability analysis,
multi-stage uncooperative game, seeding, product quality
1 Introduction
a) Motivation and problem description It is of great scientific interest to model some sociological phenomenon
as dynamics on networks, such as consensus, polarization, synchronization and propagation. Indeed, the
past fifteen years have witnessed a flourishing of research on propagation of diseases, opinions, commercial
products etc, collectively referred to as memes, on social networks. Much progress has been made both
statistically [9–12] and theoretically [3, 18, 19, 32]. In a more recent set of extensions, scientists have begun
studying the simultaneous propagation of multiple memes, in which not only the interaction between nodes
(or equivalently referred to as individuals) in the network, but also the interplay of multiple memes, plays an
important role in determining the system’s dynamical behaviors. These two forms of interactions together
add complexity and research value to the multi-meme propagation model.
This paper proposed a series of mathematical models on the propagation of competing products. Three
key elements: the interpersonal network, the individuals and the competing products, are modeled respec-
tively as a graph with fixed topology, the nodes on the graph, and the states of nodes. Our models are
based on the characterization of individuals’ decision making behaviors under the social pressure. Two fac-
tors determine individuals’ choices on which product to adopt: the endogenous factor and the exogenous
factor. The endogenous factor is the social contact between nodes via social links, which forms a tendency
∗This material is based upon work supported by, or in part by, the U. S. Army Research Laboratory and the U. S. Army
Research Office under grant number W911NF-15-1-0577, and the UCSB Institute for Collaborative Biotechnology under grant
W911NF-09-D-0001 from the U.S. Army Research Office. The content of the information does not necessarily reflect the position
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of imitation, referred to as social pressure in this paper. The exogenous factor is what is unrelated to the
network, e.g., the products’ quality.
In the microscopic level, we model the endogenous and exogenous factors respectively as two types
of product-adoption processes: the social conversion and the self conversion. In social conversion, any
node randomly picks one of its neighbors and follows that neighbor’s state with some given probability
characterizing how open-minded the node is. In the self conversion, each node independently converts from
one product to another with some given probability depending on the two products involved. Although
individuals exhibit subjective preferences when they are choosing the products, statistics on a large scale of
different individuals’ behaviors often reveal that the relative qualities of the competing products are objective.
For example, although some people may have special affections on feature phones, the fact that more people
have converted from feature phones to smart phones, rather than the other way around, indicates that the
latter is relatively better. We assume that the transit probabilities between the competing products are
determined by their relative qualities and thus homogeneous among the individuals.
b) Literature review: Various models have been proposed to describe the propagation on networks, such
as the percolation model on random graphs [23, 24], the independent cascade model [6, 16, 20], the linear
threshold model [1, 2, 35] and the epidemic-like mean-field model [31, 33, 36]. The first two are stochastic
models while the linear threshold model is usually deterministic. The epidemic-like model is an ODE system
as the approximation of a Markov chain, which gives the dynamics of any node’s state probability distribution.
As extensions to the propagation of a single meme, some recent papers have discussed the propagation
of multiple memes, e.g., see [4, 5, 8, 14, 15, 17, 25, 26, 28–30, 34]. Some of these papers adopt a Susceptible-
Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemic-like model and discuss the long-term coexistence of multiple memes in
single/multiple-layer networks, e.g., see [5,25,26]. Some papers focus instead on the strategy of initial seeding
to maximize or prevent the propagation of one specific meme in the presence of adversaries [8, 14, 17, 28].
Among all these papers mentioned in this paragraph, our model is most closely related to the work by Stanoev
et. al. [29] but the social contagion process in [29] is different from our model and theoretical analysis on the
general model is not included
c) Contribution: Firstly we propose a generalized and novel model for the competitive propagation on
social networks. By taking into account both the endogenous and exogenous factors and considering the
individual variance as well as the interplay of the competing products, our model is general enough to describe
a large class of multi-meme propagation processes. Moreover, in the modeling of multi-meme contagions,
many models come across the problem of dealing with multiple contagions to one node by different memes at
a single time step, which is usually avoided by assuming the infinitesimal step length so that it only allows
for a single contagion at every step. Differently from these models, the problem of multiple contagions does
not occur in our model since we model the contagion process as the individual’s initiative choice under the
social pressure, which is more suitable for the product-adoption process. In addition, compared with the
independent cascade model, in which individuals’ choices are irreversible, our models adopt a more realistic
assumption that conversions from one product to another are reversible and occur persistently.
Secondly, we propose a new concept, the product-conversion graph, to characterize the interplay between
the products. There are two graphs in our model: the social network describing the interpersonal connections,
and the product-conversion graph defining the transitions between the products in self conversion, which in
turn reflect the products’ relative quality.
Thirdly, starting from the description of individuals’ behavior, we develop two Markov-chain competi-
tive propagation models different in the chronological order of the social conversion and the self conversion
processes. Applying the independence approximation, we propose two respective network competitive prop-
agation models, which are difference equations systems, such that the dimension of our problem is reduced
and some theorems in the area of dynamical systems can be applied to the analysis of the approximation
models.
Fourthly, both theoretical analysis and simulation results are presented on the dynamical properties of
the network competitive propagation models. We discuss the existence, uniqueness and stability of the
fixed point, as well as how the systems’ asymptotic state probability distribution is determined by the
social network structure, the individuals’ open-mindedness, the initial condition and, most importantly, the
structure of the product-conversion graph. We find that, if the product-conversion graph contains only
one absorbing strongly connected component, then the self conversion dominates the system’s asymptotic
behavior; With multiple absorbing strongly connected components in the product-conversion graph, the
system’s asymptotic state probability distribution also depends on the initial condition, the network topology
and the individual open-mindedness. In addition, simulation results are presented to show the high accuracy
of the independence approximation and reveal that the original Markov-chain model also exhibits the same
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asymptotic behavior.
At last, based on the network competitive propagation model, and according to what actions can be taken
by the players, we propose two different models of multi-player and multi-stage non-cooperative games, in
which the players are the competing companies with bounded investment budgets. Each company can invest
on seeding, e.g., advertisement and promotion, or its product’s quality. For each game model, we investigate
the unique Nash equilibrium at each stage. Theoretical analysis reveals some strategic insights on the
seeding-quality trade-off and the allocation of seeding resources. The insights are directive and realistic. We
also discuss the systems’ behaviors if every player is adopting the policy at the Nash equilibrium.
d) Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II give the assumptions of
two Markov-chain propagation models. Section III and IV discuss the approximation of these two models
separately. In Section V, we discuss the multi-player and multi-stage competitive propagation games. Section
VI is the conclusion.
2 Model Description and Notations
a) Social network as a graph: In this model, a social network is considered as an undirected, unweighted,
fixed-topology graph G = (V,E) with n nodes. The nodes are indexed by i ∈ V = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The
adjacency matrix is denoted by A = (aij)n×n with aij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E and aij = 0 if (i, j) /∈ E.
The row-normalized adjacency matrix is denoted by A˜ = (a˜ij)n×n, where a˜ij = 1Ni aij withNi =
∑n
j=1 aij .
The graph G = (V,E) is always assumed connected and there is no self loop, i.e., a˜ii = 0 for any i ∈ V .
b) Competing products and the states of nodes: Suppose there are R competing products, denoted by
H1, H2, . . . ,HR, propagating in the network. We consider a discrete-time model, i.e., t ∈ N, and assume
the products are mutually exclusive. We do not specify the state of adopting no product and collectively
refer to all the states as “products”. Denote by Di(t) the state of node i after time step t. For any t ∈ N,
Di(t) ∈ {H1, H2, . . . ,HR}. For simplicity let Θ = {1, 2, . . . , R}, i.e., the set of the product indexes.
c) Nodes’ production adoption behavior: Two mechanisms define the individuals’ behavior: the social
conversion and the self conversion. The following two assumptions propose respectively two models different
in the chronological order of the social and self conversions.
Assumption 1 (Social-self conversion model). Consider the competitive propagation of R products in the
network G = (V,E). At time step t+1 for any t ∈ N, suppose the previous state of any node i is Di(t) = Hr.
Node i first randomly pick one of its neighbor j and following j’s previous state, i.e., Di(t+ 1) = Dj(t), with
probability αi. If node i does not follow j’s state in the social conversion, with probability 1− αi, then node
i converts to product Hs with probability δrs for any s 6= r, or stay in Hr with probability δrr.
Assumption 2 (Self-social conversion model). At any time step t+ 1, any node i with Di(t) = Hr converts
to Hs with probability δrs for any s 6= r, or stay in the state Hr with probability δrr. If node i stays in Hr in
the process above, then node i randomly picks a neighbor j and following Dj(t) with probability αi, or still
stay in Hr with probability 1− αi.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are illustrated by Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively. By introducing the parameters
δrs we define a directed and weighted graph with the adjacency matrix ∆ = (δrs)R×R, referred to as the
product-conversion graph. Figure 3 gives an example of the product-conversion graph for different smart
phone operation systems. Based on either of the two assumptions, ∆ is row-stochastic. In this paper
we discuss several types of structures of the product-conversion graph, e.g., the case when it is strongly
connected, or consists of a transient subgraph and some isolated absorbing subgraphs. The parameter αi
characterizes node i’s inclination to be influenced by social pressure. Define α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn)
> as the
individual open-mindedness vector. Assume 0 < αi < 1 for any i ∈ V .
d) Problem description: According to either Assumption 1 or Assumption 2, at any time step t+ 1, the
probability distribution of any node’s states depends on its own state as well as the states of all its neighbors
at time t. Therefore, the collective evolution of nodes’ states is a Rn-state discrete-time Markov chain.
Define pir(t) as the probability that node i is in state Hr after time step t, i.e., pir(t) = P[Di(t) = Hr]. We
aim to understand the dynamics of pir(t). Since the Markov chain models have exponential dimensions and
are difficult to analyze, we approximate it with lower-dimension difference equations systems and analyze
instead the dynamical properties of the approximation systems.
e) Notations: Before proceeding to the next section, we introduce some frequently used notations in
Table 1.
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Di(t) = Hr
randomly pick
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Di(t+ 1) = Di(t)
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Figure 1: Diagram illustration for the social-self conversion model
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Figure 2: Diagram illustration for the self-social conversion model
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Figure 3: An example of the product-conversion graph for different smart phone operation systems.
Table 1: Notations frequently used in this paper
 () entry-wise no less(greater) than
 (≺) entry-wise strictly greater(less) than
1n, 0n (1, 1, . . . , 1)> ∈ Rn×1, (0, 0, . . . , 0)> ∈
Rn×1
0n×m (0)n×m
Snm(a) The set {X ∈ Rn×m |X 
0n×m, X1m = a} for any a ∈ Rn
S˜nm(a) The set {X ∈ Rn×m |X 
0n×m, X1m  a} for any a ∈ Rn
w(M) The normalized dominant left eigenvec-
tor for matrix M ∈ Rl×l if it has one
xr The r-th column vector of the matrix
X ∈ Rn×m
x(i) The i-th row vector of the matrix X ∈
Rn×m
x(−i) The i-th row vector of the ma-
trix A˜X ∈ Rn×m, i.e., x(−i) =
(x−i1, x−i2, . . . , x−im) where x−ir =∑n
j=1 a˜ijxjr
G(A) The graph with the adjacency matrix A
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3 Network Competitive Propagation Model with Social-self con-
version
This section is based on Assumption 1. We first derive an approximation model for the time evolution of
pir(t), referred to as the social-self conversion network competitive propagation model (social-self NCPM),
and then analyze the asymptotic behavior of the approximation model and its relation to the social network
topology, the product-conversion graph, the initial condition and the individuals open-mindedness. Further
simulation work is presented in the end of this section.
3.1 Derivation of the social-self NCPM
Some notations are used in this section.
Notation 3. For the competitive propagation of products {H1, H2, . . . ,HR} on the network G = (V,E),
(1) define the random variable Xri (t) by
Xri (t) =
{
1, if Di(t) = Hr,
0, if Di(t) 6= Hr.
According to the mutual exclusiveness of the competing products, for any i ∈ V , if Xri (t) = 1, then Xsi (t) = 0
for any s 6= r;
(2) Define the n − 1 tuple D−i(t) = (D1(t), . . . , Di−1(t), Di+1(t), . . . , Dn(t)), i.e., the states of all the
nodes except node i after time step t;
(3) Define the following notations for simplicity:
P rsij (t) = P[Xri (t) = 1 |Xsj (t) = 1],
P ri (t;−i) = P[Xri (t) = 1 |D−i(t)],
Γri (t; s,−i) = P[Xri (t+ 1) = 1 |Xsi (t) = 1,D−i(t)].
In the derivation of the network competitive propagation model, the following approximation is adopted:
Approximation 4 (Independence Approximation). For the competitive propagation of R products on the
network G = (V,E), when deriving the equation for pir(t), approximate the conditional probability P
ms
ij (t)
by its corresponding total probability pim(t) for any m, s ∈ Θ and any i, j ∈ V .
With the independence approximation, the social-self NCPM is presented in the theorem below.
Theorem 5 (Social-self NCPM). Consider the competitive propagation based on Assumption 1, with the
social network and the product-conversion graph represented by their adjacency matrices A˜ = (a˜ij)n×n and
∆ = (δrs)R×R respectively. The probability pir(t) satisfies
pir(t+ 1)− pir(t)
=
∑
s6=r
αi
n∑
j=1
a˜ij
(
P srij (t)pjr(t)− P rsij (t)pjs(t)
)
+
∑
s6=r
(1− αi)(δsrpis(t)− δrspir(t)),
(1)
for any i ∈ V and r ∈ Θ. Applying the independence approximation, the approximation model for equa-
tion (1), i.e., the social-self NCPM, is
pir(t+ 1)
= αi
n∑
j=1
a˜ijpjr(t) + (1− αi)
R∑
s=1
δsrpis(t).
(2)
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Proof. By definition,
pir(t+1)− pir(t)
= E[Xri (t+ 1)−Xri (t)]
= E
[
E[Xri (t+ 1)−Xri (t) |D−i(t)]
]
,
where the conditional expectation is given by
E[Xri (t+1)−Xri (t) |D−i(t)]
= P[Xri (t+ 1)−Xri (t) = 1 |D−i(t)]
− P[Xri (t+ 1)−Xri (t) = −1 |D−i(t)]
=
∑
s6=r
Γri (t; s,−i)P si (t;−i)
−
∑
s 6=r
Γsi (t; r,−i)P ri (t;−i).
According to Assumption 1,
Γri (t; s,−i)P si (t;−i)
= αi
∑
j
a˜ijX
r
j (t)P
s
i (t;−i) + (1− αi)δsrP si (t;−i).
Therefore,
E[Γri (t; s,−i)P si (t;−i)] = αi
∑
j
a˜ijE[Xrj (t)P si (t;−i)]
+ (1− αi)δsrE[P si (t;−i)].
One the right-hand side of the equation above, E[P si (t;−i)] = pis(t). Moreover,
E[Xrj (t)P si (t;−i)]
=
∑
d−i−j
P[Xsi (t) = 1 |D−i−j(t), Xrj (t) = 1]
· P[D−i−j(t) = d−i−j , Xrj (t) = 1]
=
∑
d−i−j
P[Xsi (t) = 1, Xrj (t) = 1,D−i−j(t) = d−i−j ]
= P srij (t)pjr(t).
Apply the same computation to E[Γsi (t; r,−i)P ri (t;−i)] and then we obtain equation (1). Replace P srij (t)
and P rsij (t) by pis(t) and pir(t) respectively and according to the equations
∑
s6=r pis(t) = 1 − pir(t) and∑
s 6=r δrs = 1− δrr, we obtain equation (2).
The derivation of Theorem 5 is equivalent to the widely adopted mean-field approximation in the modeling
of the network epidemic spreading [7, 27, 31]. Notice that the independence approximation neither neglects
the correlation between any two nodes’ states, nor destroys the network topology, since pjr(t), pjs(t) and a˜ij
all appear in the dynamics of pir(t).
3.2 Asymptotic behavior of the social-self NCPM
Define the map f : Rn×R → Rn×R by
f(X) = diag(α)A˜X + (I − diag(α))X∆. (3)
According to equation (2), the matrix form of the social-self NCPM is written as
P (t+ 1) = f
(
P (t)
)
, (4)
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where P (t) = (pir(t))n×R. We analyze how the asymptotic behavior of system (4), i.e., the existence,
uniqueness and stability of the fixed point of the map f , is determined by the two graphs introduced in
our model: the social network with the adjacency matrix A˜, and the product-conversion graph with the
adjacency matrix ∆.
3.2.1 Structures of the social network and the product-conversion graph
Assume that the social network G(A˜) has a globally reachable node. As for the product-conversion graph, we
consider the more general case. Suppose that the product-conversion graph G(∆) has m absorbing strongly
connected components (absorbing SCCs) and a transient subgraph. Re-index the products such that the
product index set for any l-th absorbing SCCs is given by
Θ1 = {1, 2, . . . , k1}, and
Θl = {
l−1∑
u=1
ku + 1,
l−1∑
u=1
ku + 2, . . . ,
l∑
u=1
ku},
for any l ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m}, and the index set for the transient subgraph is Λ = {∑ml=1 kl + 1, . . . ,∑ml=1 kl +
2, . . . , R}. then the adjacency matrix ∆ of the product-conversion graph takes the following form:
∆ =
[
∆¯ 0(R−k0)×k0
Bk0×(R−k0) ∆0
]
, (5)
where ∆¯ = diag[∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆m] and B = [B1, B2, . . . , Bm], with Bl ∈ Rk0×k1 for any l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, is
nonzero and entry-wise non-negative. Matrix ∆l = (δ
Θl
rs )kl×kl , with δ
Θ1
rs = δrs and δ
Θl
rs = δ∑l−1
u=1 ku+r,
∑l−1
u=1 ku+s
for any l ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m}, is the adjacency matrix of the l-th absorbing SCC, and is thus irreducible and
row-stochastic. The following definition classifies four types of structures of G(∆).
Definition 6 (Four sets of product-conversion graphs). Based on whether the product-conversion graph
G(∆) has a transient subgraph and a single or multiple absorbing SCCs, we classify the adjacency matrix ∆
into the following four cases:
(i. Case 1 (single SCC): The graph G(∆) is strongly connected, i.e., ∆ = ∆1, with k1 = R;
(ii. Case 2 (single SCC + transient subgraph): The graph G(∆) contains one absorbing SCC and a transient
subgraph, i.e., ∆¯ = ∆1 and k0 ≥ 1;
(iii. Case 3 (multi-SCC): The graph G(∆) contains m absorbing SCCs, i.e., ∆ = diag[∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆m],
with
∑m
l=1 kl = R;
(iv. Case 4 (multi-SCC + transient subgraph): The graph G(∆) contains m absorbing SCCs and a transient
subgraph, with ∆ given by equation (5).
3.2.2 Stability analysis of the social-self NCPM
The following theorem states the distinct asymptotic behaviors of the social-self NCPM, with different
structures of the product-conversion graph.
Theorem 7 (Asymptotic behavior for social-self NCPM). Consider the social-self NCPM on a strongly
connected social network G(A˜), with the product-conversion graph G(∆). Assume that
(i. Each absorbing SCC G(∆l) of G(∆) is aperiodic;
(ii. For any ∆l, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, as least one column of ∆l is entry-wise strictly positive;
(iii. For any r ∈ Λ, ∑s∈Λ δrs < 1, i.e., ∆01k0 ≺ 1k0 .
Then, for any P (0) ∈ SnR(1n), the solution P (t) to equation (4) has the following properties, depending
upon the structure of ∆:
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(i. in Case 1, P (t) converges to P ∗ = 1n∆> exponentially fast, where P ∗ is the unique fixed point in
SnR(1n) for the map f defined by equation (3). Moreover, the convergence rate is (∆) = αmax + (1−
αmax)ζ(∆), where αmax = maxi αi and ζ(∆) = 1−
∑R
r=1 mins δsr;
(ii. in Case 2, for any i ∈ V ,
lim
t→∞ pir(t) =
{
0, for any r ∈ Λ,
wr(∆1), for any r ∈ Θ1;
(iii. in Case 3, for any l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and i ∈ V ,
lim
t→∞p
Θl(i)(t) =
(
w>(M)PΘl(0)1kl
)
w>(∆l),
where M = diag(α)A˜ + I − diagα and PΘl(t) = (pΘlir (t))n×kl , with pΘlir (t) = pi,∑l−1u=1 ku+r(t) and
pΘl(i)(t) being the i-th row of PΘl(t);
(iv. in Case 4, for any l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and i ∈ V ,
lim
t→∞ pir(t) =
{
0, for any r ∈ Λ,
γlwr(∆l), for any r ∈ Θl,
where γl depends on A˜, Bl, P
Θl(0), PΛ(0) and satisfies
∑m
l=1 γl = 1.
Before proving the theorem above, a useful and well-known lemma is stated without the proof.
Lemma 8 (Row-stochastic matrices after pairwise-difference similarity transform). Let M ∈ Rn×n be row-
stochastic. Suppose the graph G(M) is aperiodic and has a globally reachable node. Then the nonsingular
matrix
Q =

−1 1
. . .
. . .
−1 1
1/n . . . 1/n 1/n

satisfies
QMQ−1 =
[
Mred 0n−1
c> 1
]
for some c ∈ Rn−1 and Mred ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1). Moreover, Mred is discrete-time exponentially stable.
Proof of Theorem 7: (1) Case 1:
Since matrix ∆ is row-stochastic, irreducible and aperiodic, according to the Perron-Frobenius theorem,
w(∆) ∈ RR is well-defined. By substituting P ∗, defined by p∗(i) = w(∆)> for any i ∈ V , into equation (3),
we verify that P ∗ is a fixed point of f .
For any X and Y ∈ Rn×R, define the distance d(·, ·) by d(X,Y ) = ‖X − Y ‖∞. Then (SnR(1n), d) is a
complete metric space. For any X ∈ SnR(1n), it is easy to check that f(X)  0n×R and
f(X)1R = diag(α)A˜X1R + (I − diag(α))X1R = 1n.
Therefore, f maps SnR(1n) to SnR(1n).
For any X ∈ SnR(1n), according to equation (3),
‖f(X)(i)−f(P ∗)(i)‖1
≤ αi‖x(−i) − p∗(−i)‖1
+ (1− αi)‖(x(i) − p∗(i))∆‖1.
(6)
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The first term of the right-hand side of (6) satisfies
‖x(−i) − p∗(−i)‖1 =
R∑
r=1
|
n∑
j=1
a˜ijxjr − wr(∆)|
≤
R∑
r=1
n∑
j=1
a˜ij |xjr − wr(∆)|
≤ ‖X − P ∗‖∞.
The second term of the right-hand side of (6) satisfies
‖(x(i) − p∗(i))∆‖1 =
R∑
r=1
|
R∑
s=1
(
xis − ws(∆)
)
δsr|.
If x(i) = p∗(i), then
‖f(X)(i) − f(P ∗)(i)‖1 ≤ αi‖X − P ∗‖∞.
If x(i) 6= p∗(i), since x(i)1R = p∗(i)1R = 1, both the set θ1 = {s |xis ≥ ws(∆)} and the set θ2 = {s |xis <
ws(∆)} are nonempty and ∑
s∈θ1
(
xis − ws(∆)
)
=
∑
s∈θ2
(
ws(∆)− xis
)
=
1
2
R∑
s=1
|xis − ws(∆)|.
Therefore,
‖(x(i)−p∗(i))∆‖1
=
R∑
r=1
R∑
s=1
|xis − ws(∆)|δsr
− 2
R∑
r=1
min{
∑
s∈θ1
(xis − ws(∆))δsr,∑
s∈θ2
(ws(∆)− xis)δsr},
(7)
where
min{
∑
s∈θ1
(xis − ws(∆))δsr,
∑
s∈θ2
(ws(∆)− xis)δsr}
≥ 1
2
min
s
δsr‖x(i) − p∗(i)‖1.
Substituting the inequality above into (7), we obtain
‖(x(i) − p∗(i))∆‖1 ≤
(
1−
R∑
r=1
min
s
δsr
)
‖x(i) − p∗(i)‖1.
Since
∑R
r=1 δsr = 1 for any s,
∑R
r=1 mins δsr is no larger than 1. In addition, since at least one column of ∆
is strictly positive,
∑R
r=1 mins δsr > 0. Therefore,
0 ≤ ζ(∆) = 1−
R∑
r=1
min
s
δsr < 1, and
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‖f(X)(i) − p∗(i)‖1 ≤
(
αi + (1− αi)ζ(∆)
)|X − P ∗‖∞.
This leads to
‖f(X)− f(P ∗)‖∞ ≤ (∆)‖X − P ∗‖∞,
for any X ∈ SnR(1n) and 0 < (∆) < 1. This concludes the proof for Case 1.
(2) Case 2:
For the transient subset Λ, define PΛ(t) =
(
pΛir(t)
)
n×k0 , with p
Λ
ir(t) = pi,r+k1(t), for any i ∈ V and
r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k0}. Then,
PΛ(t+ 1) = diag(α)A˜PΛ(t) + (I − diag(α))PΛ(t)∆0.
According to Assumption (iii) of Theorem 7,
c = max
r∈{1,2,...,k0}
k0∑
s=1
δΛrs < 1, and ∆01k0 ≤ c1k0 .
Therefore,
PΛ(t+1)1k0

(
diag(α)A˜+ c
(
I − diag(α)))PΛ(t)1k0 .
Since ρ
(
diag(α)A˜+ c
(
I − diag(α))) < 1, for any PΛ(0) ∈ S˜nk0(1n), PΛ(t)→ 0n×k0 exponentially fast.
Define PΘ1(t) = (pir(t))n×k1 . then we have
PΘ1(t+ 1)
= diag(α)A˜PΘ1(t) +
(
I − diag(α))PΘ1(t)∆1
+
(
I − diag(α))PΛ(t)B.
Since PΛ(t) converges to 0n×k0 exponentially fast, we have: 1) there exists C > 0 and 0 < ξ < 1 such that
‖(I − diag(α)PΛ(t)B)‖∞ ≤ Cξt;
2) ‖PΘ1(t)1k1 − 1k1‖∞ → 0 exponentially fast, which implies d
(
PΘ1(t), Snk1(1n)
)→ 0 exponentially fast.
For any X ∈ S˜nk1(1n), define map f˜ by
f˜(X) = diag(α)A˜X +
(
I − diag(α))X∆1.
According to the proof for Case 1, there exists a unique fixed point P˜ ∗ for the map f˜ in Snk1(1n), given by
p˜∗ir = wr(∆1). Moreover, there exists 0 <  < 1 such that, for any X ∈ Snk1(1n),
‖f˜(X)− P˜ ∗‖∞ ≤ ‖X − P˜ ∗‖∞.
Since the function ‖f˜(X)−P˜
∗‖∞
‖X−P˜∗‖∞ is continuous in S˜nk1(1n) \ P˜
∗ and d
(
PΘ1(t), Snk1(1n)
) → 0, there exists
T > 0 and 0 < η < 1 such that, for any t > T ,
‖f˜(PΘ1(t))− P˜ ∗‖∞ ≤ η‖PΘ1(t)− P˜ ∗‖∞.
For t ∈ N much larger than T ,
‖PΘ1(t)− P˜ ∗‖∞
≤ η‖PΘ1(t− 1)− P˜ ∗‖∞ + Cξt
= ηt−T ‖PΘ1(T )− P˜ ∗‖∞ + C ξ
t − ηt−T ξT
η/ξ
.
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Since 0 < η < 1, 0 < ξ < 1 as t→∞, ‖PΘ1(t)− P˜ ∗‖∞ → 0. This concludes the proof for Case 2.
(3) Case 3:
For any l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m},
PΘl(t+ 1)
= fˆ
(
PΘl(t)
)
=
(
I − diag(α))PΘl(t)∆l + diag(α)A˜PΘl(t),
where ∆l1kl = 1kl since Θl is absorbing and strongly connected. Therefore,
PΘl(t+ 1)1kl = MP
Θl(t)1kl ,
where M = I−diag(α)+diag(α)A˜ is row-stochastic and aperiodic. Moreover, the graph G(M) has a globally
reachable node and therefore the matrix M has a normalized dominant left eigenvector w(M). Applying
the Perron-Frobenius theorem,
lim
t→∞P
Θl(t)1kl =
(
w>(M)PΘl(0)1kl
)
1n.
Let cl = w
>(M)PΘl(0)1kl . Following the same line of argument in the proof for Case 2, fˆ maps
Snkl(cl1n) to Snkl(cl1n), and maps S˜nkl(cl1n) to S˜nkl(cl1n). Moreover, Pˆ
∗ ∈ Rn×kl with pˆ∗(i) = clw>(∆l),
for any i ∈ V , is the unique fixed point of the map fˆ in Snkl(cl1n). In addition, there exists 0 <  < 1 such
that for any X ∈ Snkl(cl1n),
‖fˆ(X)− Pˆ ∗‖∞ ≤ ‖X − Pˆ ∗‖∞.
The function hˆ(X) = ‖fˆ(X)−Pˆ
∗‖∞
‖X−Pˆ∗‖∞ is continuous in S˜nkl(cl1n)\Pˆ
∗. Since for any PΘl(0) ∈ S˜nkl(cl1n)\Pˆ ∗,
we have PΘl(t)1kl → cl1kl , which implies d
(
PΘl(t), Snkl(cl1kl)
) → 0 as t → 0. Therefore, there exists
0 < η < 1 and T > 0 such that for any t > T ,
‖fˆ(PΘl(t))− Pˆ ∗‖∞ ≤ η‖PΘl(t)− Pˆ ∗‖∞.
Therefore, PΘl(t)→ Pˆ ∗ as t→∞.
(4) Case 4:
PΘl(t+ 1) = diag(α)A˜PΘl(t)
+
(
I − diag(α))PΘl(t)∆l
+
(
I − diag(α))PΛ(t)Bl.
for any l ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Therefore,
PΘl(t+ 1)1kl = MP
Θl(t)1kl + φ(t), (8)
where M = diag(α)A˜+ I − diag(α) is row-stochastic and primitive. The vector φ(t) is a vanishing pertur-
bation according to the proof for Case 2.
Let x(t) = PΘl(t)1kl and y(t) = Qx(t) withQ defined in Lemma 8. Let yerr(t) = (y1(t), y2(t), . . . , yn−1(t))
>,
where yi(t) = xi+1(t)− xi(t) for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Then we have
y(t+ 1) = QMQ−1y(t) +Qφ(t).
Let ϕ(t) =
(
ϕ1(t), ϕ2(t), . . . , ϕn−1(t)
)>
with ϕi(t) =
∑
j Qijφj(t). ϕ(t) is also a vanishing perturbation and
yerr(t+ 1) = Mredyerr(t) +ϕ(t).
The equation above is an exponentially stable linear system with a vanishing perturbation. Since ρ(Mred) <
1, yerr → 0n−1 as t→∞, which implies that PΘl(t)1kl → γ1n and γl depends on M , Bl, PΘl(0) and PΛ(0).
Moreover,
∑
l γl = 1 since P (t)1R = 1n. Following the same argument in the proof for Case 3, we obtain
lim
t→∞p
Θl(i)(t) = γlw
>(∆l).
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3.2.3 Interpretations of Theorem 7
Analysis on Case 1 to 4 leads to the following conclusions: 1) The probability of adopting any product in the
transient subgraph eventually decays to zero; 2) For the product-conversion graph with only on absorbing
SCC G(∆1), the system’s asymptotic product-adoption probability distribution only depends on w(∆1). In
this case, the self conversion dominates the competitive propagation process; 3) With multiple absorbing
SCCs in the product-conversion graph, the initial condition P (t) and the structure of the social network
G(A˜) together determine the fraction each absorbing SCC eventually takes in the total probability 1; 4)
In each absorbing SCC G(∆l), the asymptotic adoption probability for each product is proportional to its
corresponding entry of ∆l.
3.3 Further simulation work
a) Accuracy of the social-self NCPM solution: Simulation results have been presented to compare the solution
to the social-self NCPM with the solution to the original Markov chain model defined by Assumption 1. Let
the matrix ∆ take the following form
∆ =
∆1 0 00 ∆2 0
B1 B2 ∆0
 =
0.6 0.4 0 00.3 0.7 0 00 0 1 0
0 0.8 0 0.2
 . (9)
The Markov-chin solution is computed by the Monte Carlo method. In each sampling, A, α and P (0) are
randomly generated and set identical for the Markov chain and the NCPM. The probability p12(t) is plotted
for both models on different types of social networks, such as the complete graph, the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph,
the power-law graph and the star graph. As shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5, the solution to the social-self
NCPM nearly overlaps with the Markov-chain solution in every plot, due to the i.i.d self conversion process.
b) Asymptotic behavior of the Markov chain model In Figure 6 and Figure 7, all the trajectories pir(t),
for the Markov-chain model on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph with n = 5, p = 0.4 and randomly generated α, are
computed by the Monte Carlo method. Figure 6(a) corresponds to the structure of the product-conversion
graph defined by Case 4 in Definition 6 with
∆1 =
[
0.6 0.4
0.3 0.7
]
,∆2 = 1,∆0 = 0.2, B = [0 0.8 0].
The transient subgraph is only connected to SCC Θ1 and the intial adoption probability for H3 is 0. Fig-
ure 6(b) corresponds to the structure of the product-conversion graph defined by Case 3 in Defintion 6
with
∆ =
[
∆1 0
0 ∆2
]
,∆1 =
[
0.6 0.4
0.3 0.7
]
,∆2 =
[
0.5 0.5
0.1 0.9
]
.
The simulation results shows that, in these two cases the Markov-chain solutions converge exactly to the
values indicated by the social-self NCPM, regardless of the initial condition. The matrix ∆ used in Figure 7
is given by equation (9). As illustrated by Figure 7, the asymptotic adoption probabilities vary with the
initial condition in the Markov-chain model, in consistence with the results of Theorem 7.
4 Analysis on the Self-social Network Competitive Propagation
Model
In this section we discuss the network competitive propagation model based on Assumption 2, i.e, the case
in which self conversion occurs before social conversion at each time step. Similar to what we have done in
the last section, firstly we propose an approximation model, referred to as the self-social network competitive
propagation model (self-social NCPM), and then analyze the dynamical properties of this approximation
model.
The following theorem based on Approximation 4 gives the matrix form of the self-social NCPM.
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(d) n = 50, p = 1
Figure 4: Difference between the solutions to the social-self NCPM (blue dash) and the original Markov-chain
model (red) in complete graphs or Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs.
0 10 20 30 400.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
t
p 1
2(t
)
(a) power-law graph
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Figure 5: Difference between the solutions to the social-self NCPM (blue dash) and the original Markov-
chain model (red) in the power-law graph and the star graph. The power-law graph has 100 nodes, with the
degree distribution p(k) = 1010k−2.87. The star graph consists of 10 nodes with node 1 as the center.
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Figure 6: Asymptotic behavior of the Markov chain model with the production-conversion graphs defined
by Case 3 or Case 4 in Defintion 6. Every curve in this plot is a trajectory pir(t) for i ∈ V and r ∈ Θ. Here
xlr = w
>(M)PΘl(0)1klwr(∆l).
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Figure 7: Asymptotic behavior of the Markov chain model with the production-conversion graph consisting
of multiple SCCs and a transient subgraph. Every curve in this plot is a trajectory pir(t) for i ∈ V and
r ∈ Θ.
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Theorem 9 (Self-social NCPM). Consider the competitive propagation model based on Assumption 2, with
the social network and the product-conversion graph represented by their adjacency matrices A˜ and ∆ re-
spectively. The probability pir(t) satisfies
pir(t+ 1)− pir(t) =
∑
s6=r
(
δsrpis(t)− δrspir(t)
)
+
∑
s6=r
δssαi
n∑
j=1
a˜ijpis(t)P
rs
ji (t)
−
∑
s6=r
δrrαi
n∑
j=1
a˜ijpir(t)P
sr
ji (t),
for any i ∈ V and r ∈ Θ. Applying the independence assumption, the matrix form of the self-social NCPM
is
P (t+ 1)
= P (t)∆ + diag(α) diag
(
P (t)δ
)
A˜P (t)
− diag(α)P (t) diag(δ),
(10)
with P (t) = (pir(t))n×R and δ = (δ11, δ22, . . . , δRR)>.
It is straightforward to check that, for any P (t) ∈ SnR(1n), P (t+ 1) is still in SnR(1n). According to the
Brower fixed point theorem, there exists at least one fixed point for the system (10) in SnR(1n). Since the
nonlinearity of equation (10) add much difficulty to the analysis of it, in the remaining part of this section
we discuss the special case when R = 2.
4.1 Existence and uniqueness of the fixed point
For simplicity, in this section, let p(t) = p2(t) =
(
p12(t), p22(t), . . . , pn2(t)
)>
. Without loss of generality, we
always assume that δ22 ≥ δ11. Define the map h : Rn → Rn by
h(x) = δ121n + (1− δ12 − δ21)x
+ δ11 diag(α)A˜x− δ22 diag(α)x
+ (δ22 − δ11) diag(α) diag(x)A˜x.
(11)
Then the self-social NCPM for R = 2 is written as
p(t+ 1) = h(p(t)), (12)
and p1(t) is computed by p1(t) = 1n − p(t).
First we prove that the two-product self-social NCPM possesses a unique fixed point.
Lemma 10 (Invariant domain of map h). The map h defined by equation (11) is a continuous map from
[0, 1]n to [0, 1]n itself.
Proof. The map h is polynomial and hence continuous. Firstly, we prove that, for any x ∈ [0, 1]n, h(x)  0n.
Since
h(x) = δ12(1n − x) + δ11 diag(α)A˜x
+ (1− δ21)x− δ22 diag(α)x
+ (δ22 − δ11) diag(α) diag(x)A˜x
and
(1− δ21)x− δ22 diag(α)x  (1− δ21 − δ22)x = 0n,
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the right-hand side of the expression of h is nonnegative. Therefore, for any x ∈ [0, 1]n, h(x)  0n.
Secondly, we prove that for any x ∈ [0, 1]n, h(x)  1n. Recall that x−i = (A˜x)i =
∑
j a˜ijxj . That is,
x−i is the weighted average of all the xj ’s except xi and the value of x−i does not depend on xi since a˜ii = 0.
Moreover, since
∑
j a˜ij = 1 for any i ∈ V , x−i is also in the interval [0, 1]. According to equation (11),
rewrite the i-th entry of h(x) as
h(x)i = δ12 + δ11αix−i + ηixi,
where ηi = 1−δ12−δ21−δ22αi+(δ22−δ11)αix−i. The maximum value of ηi is 1−δ12−δ21−δ11αi, obtained
when x−i = 1. Therefore,
ηixi ≤ max(1− δ12 − δ21 − δ11αi, 0).
Then we have
h(x)i ≤ δ12 + δ11αi + max(1− δ12 − δ21 − δ11αi, 0)
= max(δ22, δ12 + δ11αi) < 1.
The inequality above leads to h(x)  1n for any x ∈ [0, 1]n.
Theorem 11 (Existence and uniqueness of the fixed point for two-product self-social NCPM). The map
h defined by equation (11), with parameters δ11, δ12, δ21, δ22, α1, . . . , αn all in the interval (0, 1) and
δ22 ≥ δ11, possesses a unique fixed point point p∗ in [0, 1]n.
Proof. According to Lemma 10, for any p(t) ∈ [0, 1]n, p(t + 1) is still in [0, 1]n. According to the Brower
fixed point theorem, there exists p∗ such that h(p∗) = p∗. This concludes the proof of the existence of a
fixed point.
Any fixed point of map h should satisfy h(p∗) = p∗, that is,
0n = δ121n + δ11 diag(α)A˜p
∗
+ (δ22 − δ11) diag(α) diag(p∗)A˜p∗
− (δ12 + δ21)p∗ − δ22 diag(α)p∗.
(13)
Therefore,
p∗ = δ12K−11n + δ11K−1 diag(α)A˜p∗
+ (δ22 − δ11)K−1 diag(α) diag(p∗)A˜p∗,
where K = (δ12 + δ21)I + δ22 diag(α) is a positive diagonal matrix. Define a map T : Rn → Rn by
T (x) = δ12K
−11n + δ11K−1 diag(α)A˜x
+ (δ22 − δ11)K−1 diag(α) diag(x)A˜x.
(14)
The the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point in [0, 1]n for the map h is equivalent to the existence
and uniqueness of the fixed point for the map T . Now we prove that T has a unique fixed point in [0, 1]n by
showing that T maps [0, 1]n to [0, 1]n and T is a contraction map.
For any x and y ∈ [0, 1]n, define the distance d(x,y) by d(x,y) = ‖x − y‖∞. Then ([0, 1]n, d) is a
complete metric space.
According to equation (14), since K−1, diag(α), A˜, δ22 − δ11 and diag(x) are all nonnegative, for any x,
y ∈ [0, 1]n and x  y, we have T (x)  T (y). Moreover,
T (0n) = δ12K
−11n  0n,
and
T (1n) = δ12K
−11n + δ11K−1α+ (δ22 − δ11)K−1α
= δ12K
−11n + δ22K−1α.
Since
T (1n)i =
δ12 + δ22αi
δ12 + δ21 + δ22αi
< 1,
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we have T (1n) ≺ 1n. Therefore, for any x ∈ [0, 1]n, T (x) ∈ [0, 1]n, i.e., T maps [0, 1]n to [0, 1]n.
Now we prove that T is a contraction map. For any x, y ∈ [0, 1]n,
T (x)i − T (y)i = δ11αi
Ki
(x−i − y−i)
+
(δ22 − δ11)αi
Ki
(xix−i − yiy−i).
Moreover,
|x−i − y−i| ≤
n∑
j=1
a˜ij |xj − yj |
≤ (
n∑
j=1
a˜ij) max
j
|xj − yj | = ‖x− y‖∞,
and
|xix−i − yiy−i|
≤ max (max
i
y2i −min
i
x2i , max
i
x2i −min
i
y2i
)
≤ 2‖x− y‖∞.
Therefore,
|T (x)i − T (y)i| ≤ i‖x− y‖∞,
where i =
(2δ22−δ11)αi
δ12+δ21+δ22αi
. It is easy to check that i < 1 for any i ∈ V and i does not depend on the x and
y. Let  = maxi i. Then for any x, y ∈ [0, 1]n,
‖T (x)− T (y)‖∞ ≤ ‖x− y‖∞ with  < 1.
Applying the Banach fixed point theorem, we know that the map T possesses a unique fixed point p∗ in
[0, 1]n. In addition, for any p(0), the sequence {p(t)}t∈N defined by p(t+ 1) = T
(
p(t)
)
satisfies
lim
t→∞p(t) = p
∗.
Theorem 11 not only proves the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point p∗ in [0, 1]n, but also implies
some properties of p∗ by introducing the map T . Two properties of p∗ are given below.
Corollary 12 (Lower and upper bound of the unique fixed point). For the two-product self-social NCPM
with δ22 ≥ δ11, the unique fixed point p∗ in [0, 1]n satisfies
1
2
1n  p∗  δ12
δ12 + δ21
1n. (15)
Proof. One can easily check that when δ22 ≥ δ11, T ( 121n)  121n and T ( δ12δ12+δ21 1n)  δ12δ12+δ21 1n. Therefore,
T maps S = {x ∈ Rn | 121n  x  δ12δ12+δ21 1n} to S itself. Since T is a contraction map, the unique fixed
point p∗ is in S.
This corollary has a meaningful interpretation. The condition δ22 ≥ δ11 is equivalent to δ12 ≥ δ21, which
means that the nodes in state H1 have a higher or equal tendency of converting to H2 than the tendency of
self conversion from H2 to H1. In this sense the product H2 is advantageous to H1 and therefore the fixed
point is in favor of H2, that is, p
∗ ≥ 121n.
The following corollary gives an upper bound for the difference between p∗i and p
∗
−i =
∑
j a˜ijp
∗
j .
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Corollary 13 (Difference between p∗i and p
∗
−i). For the two-product self-social NCPM with δ22 ≥ δ11, the
unique fixed point satisfies, for any i ∈ V ,
p∗i − p∗−i ≤
1− 12αi
αi
δ22 − δ11
δ22 + δ11
. (16)
Proof. According to equation (13), we have
Cip
∗
i − C−ip∗−i = δ12 − δ12p∗i ,
where Ci = δ21 + δ22αi and C−i = δ11αi + (δ22 − δ11)αip∗i .
Firstly we point out that Ci > C−i because
Ci − C−i = δ21 + αi(δ22 − δ11)(1− p∗i ) > 0.
Moreover,
p∗i−p∗−i
=
δ12 − (δ12 + Ci − C−i)p∗i
C−i
=
δ12 −
(
δ12 + δ21 + αi(δ22 − δ11)(1− p∗i )
)
p∗i
δ11αi + (δ22 − δ11)αip∗i
.
The right-hand side of the equation above with 12 ≤ p∗i ≤ δ12δ12+δ21 achieves its maximum value
1− 12αi
αi
δ22 − δ11
δ22 + δ11
at p∗i =
1
2 . This concludes the proof.
4.2 Stability of the unique fixed point
Notice that any sequence {p(t)}t∈N defined by p(t+ 1) = T (p(t)) converging to p∗ does not necessarily lead
to the global stability of p∗ for the system (12). Further analysis is needed for the global or local stability
of the same fixed point p∗ in system (12).
First we consider a special case in which δ11 = δ22.
Proposition 14 (Global Stability for the two-product self-social NCPM with δ11 = δ22). For the two-product
self-social NCPM given by equation (12), if δ11 = δ22, then the system has a unique fixed point p
∗ = 121n
and for any initial condition p(0), the solution sequence {p(t)}t∈N computed by p(t+ 1) = h
(
p(t)
)
converges
to p∗ exponentially fast.
Proof. With δ11 = δ22, the map h becomes
h
(
x
)
= x+ δ121n − 2δ12x+ δ11 diag(α)
(
A˜x− x).
One can easily check that p∗ = 121n is a fixed point. According to Theorem 11, the fixed point is unique.
Let p(t) = y(t) + 121n. Then the two-product self-social NCPM becomes
y(t+ 1) = My(t),
where M = (1− 2δ12)I + δ11 diag(α)A˜− δ11 diag(α).
For any i ∈ V , if 1− 2δ12 − δ11αi ≥ 0, then the i-th absolute row sum of M is equal to
n∑
j=1
|Mij | = 1− 2δ12 − δ11αi + δ11αi = 1− 2δ12 < 1,
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and, if 1− 2δ12 − δ11αi < 0, the i-th absolute row sum satisfies
n∑
j=1
|Mij | = 2δ12 + δ11αi + δ11αi − 1 < 1.
Since ρ(M) ≤ ‖M‖∞ = maxi
∑n
j=1|Mij |, the spectral radius of M is strictly less than 1. The fixed point
p∗ = 121n is exponentially stable for any initial condition p(t) ∈ [0, 1]n.
For the case δ22 > δ11, we give two propositions on the sufficient conditions, which are inequalities on
the parameters α, δ11 and δ22, for the local stability and global stability respectively. By “global stability”
we mean the stability of p∗ for any p(0) ∈ [0, 1]n.
Proposition 15 (Sufficient condition on local stability for two-product self-social NCPM with δ22 > δ11).
Consider the two-product self-social NCPM (12) on the connected network represented by the adjacency
matrix A. Suppose δ22 > δ11. Then the unique fixed point p
∗ is locally stable as long as
αi <
8δ11δ22
(δ22 − δ11)2 + 8δ11δ22 . (17)
Proof. Let p(t) = y(t) + p∗. Then system (12) becomes
y(t+ 1) = My + (δ22 − δ11) diag(α) diag(y(t))A˜y(t).
The right-hand side of the equation above is a linear term My(t) with a constant matrix M , plus a quadratic
term. The matrix M can be decomposed as M = M˜ − δ12I and M˜ = M˜ (1) + M˜ (2) is further decomposed
into a diagonal matrix M˜ (1) and a matrix M˜ (2) in which all the diagonal entries are 0. Since
M˜ (1) = (1− δ12)I − δ22 diag(α)
+ (δ22 − δ11) diag(α) diag(A˜p∗)
is a positive diagonal matrix, and
M˜ (2) = δ11 diag(α)A˜+ (δ22 − δ11) diag(α) diag(p∗)A˜
is a matrix with all the diagonal entries being zero and all the off-diagonal entries being nonnegative, the
matrix M˜ = M˜ (1) + M˜ (2) is nonnegative and, thereby, the matrix M is thus a Metzler matrix.
Since A˜ = diag( 1N1 ,
1
N2
, . . . , 1Nn )A, the matrix M˜ can be written in the form DA+E, where A is symmetric
and D, E are positive diagonal matrix. One can easily prove that all the eigenvalues of any matrix in the
form M˜ = DA+ E are real since M˜ is similar to the symmetric matrix D
1
2 (A+D−1E)D
1
2 .
The local stability of p∗ is equivalent to the inequality ρ(M) < 1, which is in turn equivalent to the
intersection of the following two conditions: λmax(M˜) < 1 + δ12 and λmin(M˜) > −1 + δ12.
First we prove λmax(M˜) < 1 + δ12. Since A is irreducible and α  0n, p∗  0n, we have M˜ij > 0 if and
only if aij > 0 for any i 6= j. In addition, M˜ii > 0 for any i ∈ V . Therefore, M˜ is irreducible, aperiodic and
thus primitive. According to the Perron-Frobenius theorem, λmax(M˜) = ρ(M˜). We have ρ(M˜) ≤ ‖M˜‖∞
and for any i ∈ V , ∑
j
|M˜ij | = 1− δ21 + (δ22 − δ11)
(
αi(p
∗
−i + p
∗
i )− αi
)
.
According to Corollary 12, for any i ∈ V ,
1− δ21 ≤
∑
j
|M˜ij | ≤ 1− δ21 + (δ12 − δ21)
2
δ12 + δ21
αi < 1 + δ12.
Therefore,
λmax(M˜) ≤ 1− δ21 + (δ12 − δ21)
2
δ12 + δ21
αi < 1 + δ12.
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Now we prove λmin(M˜) > −1 + δ12. According to the Gershgorin circle theorem,
λmin(M˜) ≥ min
i
(M˜ii −
∑
j 6=i
|M˜ij |).
For any i ∈ V ,
M˜ii−
∑
j 6=i
|M˜ij |
= 1− δ21 − δ22αi + (δ22 − δ11)αi
∑
j
a˜ijp
∗
j
− δ11αi − (δ22 − δ11)αip∗i
= 1− δ21 − αi(δ22 + δ11)
− αi(δ22 − δ11)(p∗i − p∗−i).
According to Corollary 13,
p∗i − p∗−i ≤
1− 12αi
αi
δ22 − δ11
δ22 + δ11
.
Moreover, inequality (17) is necessary and sufficient to
1− 12αi
αi
δ22 − δ11
δ22 + δ11
<
1− αi
αi
δ22 + δ11
δ22 − δ11 .
Therefore,
M˜ii−
∑
j 6=i
|M˜ij |
> 1− δ21 − αi(δ22 + δ11)− (1− αi)(δ22 + δ11)
= −1 + δ12,
for any i ∈ V . That is to say, the inequality (17) is sufficient to ρ(M) < 1, i.e., the local stability of p∗.
From the proof we know that, around the unique fixed point, the linearized system is y(t+ 1) = My(t),
where M is a Metzler matrix and is Hurwitz stable. Usually the Metzler matrices are presented in continuous-
time network dynamics models, for example, the epidemic spreading model [13, 21]. In the proof of Propo-
sition 15, we provide an example for which the Metzler matrix appears in a stable discrete-time system.
In the proposition below, a sufficient condition on the global stability of p∗ is given.
Proposition 16 (Sufficient condition on global stability for two-product self-social NCPM with δ22 > δ11).
Consider the two-product self-social NCPM on the connected network with adjacency matrix A. Suppose
δ22 > δ11. If
αi <
δ22 + δ11
3δ22 − δ11 , (18)
then
(i. for any initial condition p(0) ∈ [0, 1]n, the sequence {p(t)}t∈N defined by p(t + 1) = f
(
p(t)
)
satisfies
p(t)→ p∗ exponentially fast as t→∞;
(ii. and moreover, the convergence rate is upper bounded by maxi
(
max(i,Kii + Ki − 1)
)
, where i and
Ki are respectively defined by i = (2δ22 − δ11)αi/Ki, and Ki = δ12 + δ21 + δ22αi.
Proof. Observe that the maps h and T satisfy the following relation:
h(x) = KT (x) + (I −K)x,
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for any x ∈ [0, 1]n, where K = (δ12 + δ21)I + δ22 diag(α). For any x, y ∈ [0, 1]n,
|h(x)i−h(y)i|
= |Ki
(
T (x)i − T (y)i
)
+ (1−Ki)(xi − yi)|.
We estimate the upper bound of |h(x)i − h(y)i| in terms of ‖x− y‖∞ in two cases.
Case 1: δ12 + δ21 + δ22αi < 1 for any i, i.e, αi <
δ11
δ22
+ 1− 1δ22 for any i. First we point out that
δ11
δ22
+ 1− 1
δ22
<
δ11 + δ22
3δ22 − δ11
always holds as long as δ11 < δ22. Then recall that, for any x, y ∈ [0, 1]n,
|T (x)i − T (y)i| ≤ i‖x− y‖∞,
where i =
(2δ22−δ11)αi
Ki
< 1. Therefore,
|h(x)i − h(y)i| ≤ (Kii + 1−Ki)‖x− y‖∞,
for any i ∈ V . The coefficient Kii + 1−Ki is always strictly less than 1 because it is a convex combination
of i < 1 and 1. Therefore, h is a contraction map.
Case 2: There exists some i such that δ12 + δ21 + δ22αi ≥ 1, i.e., αi ≥ δ11δ22 + 1− 1δ22 . In this case, for any
such i,
|h(x)i − h(y)i| ≤ (Kii +Ki − 1)‖x− y‖∞.
If
αi <
δ11 + δ22
3δ22 − δ11 ,
then we have
Kii +Ki − 1 = (3δ22 − δ11)αi + δ12 + δ21 − 1
< δ11 + δ22 + δ12 + δ21 − 1
= 1.
Therefore, h is also a contraction map.
Combining Case 1 and Case 2 we conclude that if αi <
δ11+δ22
3δ22−δ11 for any i ∈ V , then h is a contraction
map. According to Lemma 10, h maps [0, 1]n to [0, 1]n. Therefore, according to the Banach fixed point
theorem, for any initial condition p(0) ∈ [0, 1]n, the solution p(t) converges to p∗ exponentially fast and the
convergence rate is upper bounded by maxi
(
max(i,Kii +Ki − 1)
)
.
Figure 8 plots the right-hand sides of inequalities (17) and (18), respectively, as functions of the ratio
δ11
δ22
, for the case when 0 < δ11δ22 < 1. One can observe that, for a large range of
δqq
δ22
, the sufficient condition
we propose for the global stability is more conservative than the sufficient condition for the local stability.
One major difference between the self-social and the social-self NCPM in the asymptotic property is
that, in the self-social NCPM, every individual’s state probability distribution is not necessarily identical.
Moreover, distinct from the social-self NCPM, for any of the four cases of G(∆) defined in Definition 6,
the asymptotic behavior of the self-social NCPM depends on not only the structure of G(∆), but also the
structure of the social network G(A˜) and the individual open-mindedness α.
5 Non-cooperative Multi-stage Competitive Propagation Games
In this section, based on the social-self NCPM given by equation (4), we propose two types of non-cooperative,
multi-player and multi-stage games. The players are the R companies, each of which has a product competing
in the social network. At each time step, based on the system’s current product-adoption probability
distribution, all the companies make decisions on the allocation of their investments, with limited budget, to
maximize the probability that their products are adopted after the current time step. In the first subsection
we discuss the model in which each company can invest both on seeding, e.g., advertisement and promotion,
and on the product’s quality; Then, in the second subsection, we discuss the model in which the products’
quality is fixed and the companies can only invest on seeding.
All the notations in Table 1 and the previous sections still apply and, in Table 2, we introduce some
additional notations and functions exclusively for this section.
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Table 2: Notations and functions used in Section V
X(t) seeding matrix at time t. X(t) =(
xir(t)
)
n×R, where xir(t) ≥ 0 is com-
pany r’s investment on seeding for in-
dividual i. xr(t) is the r-th column of
X(t) and x(i)(t) is the i-th column of
X(t)
w(t) the quality investment vector at time
t. w(t) ∈ RR×1, and each entry
wr(t) ≥ 0 is company r’s investment
at time t on product Hr’s quality
c the budget vector. c ∈ RR×1 and c 
0R. entry cr is the budget limit for
company r
ψr(x
(i); γ) ψr : R1×R≥0 → R≥0 defined by
ψr(x
(i); γ) = xir/(x
(i)1R + γ), with
model parameter γ > 0
gr(w) gr : RR×1≥0 → R≥0 defined by gr(w) =
wr/1>Rw, if wr > 0; gr(w) = 0, if
wr = 0
Ω the set of all the players’ possible ac-
tions. Ω = {(X,w)|X  0n×R,w 
0R,1>nX +w
>  c>}
Ωr the action space for company r. Ωr =
{(xr, wr) |xr  0R, wr ≥ 0,1>nxr +
wr ≤ cr}
βr(t) βr(t) =
(
β1r(t), . . . , βnr(t)
)>
=
A˜pr(t)
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Figure 8: This figure illustrates how the conditions for the local stability and global stability change with
the ratio δ11/δ22. Curve (1) is 8δ11δ22/((δ22)− δ11)2 + 8δ11δ22), i.e, corresponding to the condition for local
stability. Curve (2) is (δ22 + δ11)/(3δ22 − δ11), corresponding to the condition for global stability. Curve (3)
is δ11/δ22.
5.1 Model 1: competitive seeding-quality game
a) Model set-up: The multi-stage competitive seeding-quality game is formalized as follows.
a.1) Players: The players are the R companies. Each company r has a product Hr competing on the
network.
a.2) Players’ actions: At each time step, each company r has two types of investments. The investment
on seeding, i.e., xr(t), changes the individuals’ product-adoption probability in the social conversion process,
while the investment on quality, i.e., wr(t), influences the product-conversion graph. The total investment
is bounded by a fixed budget cr, i.e., 1>n xr(t) + wr(t) ≤ cr.
a.3) Rules: We model the effect of investment on seeding as follows. For any individual i ∈ V , each
company r’s investment xir(t) creates a ”virtual node” in the network, who is always adopting the prod-
uct Hr. In the social conversion process, the probability that individual i picks any company r’s virtual
node is ψr
(
x(i)(t); γ
)
for any i ∈ V and r ∈ Θ. The probability that individual i picks individual j in
the social conversion process is then given by
(
1 −∑Rs=1 ψs(x(i); γ))a˜ij . As for the investment on prod-
uct quality, we assume that the product-conversion graph is associated with a rank-one adjacency matrix
[δ11n, δ21n, . . . , δR1n] and δr = gr(w(t)) is determined by all the companies’ investments on product quality.
We exclude the non-realistic case when w = 0R by imposing an additional condition on the budget vector
c, which is specified later in this subsection. With each company r’s action
(
xr(t), wr(t)
)
at time t, the
dynamics of the product-adoption probabilities P (t) ∈ Rn×R≥0 is given by
pir(t) = αi
γ
x(i)(t)1R + γ
n∑
k=1
a˜ikpkr(t− 1)
+ αiψr
(
x(i)(t); γ
)
+ (1− αi)gr
(
w(t)
)
,
(19)
for any i ∈ V and r ∈ Θ.
a.4) Pay-offs: At each time step t, the pay-off for any company r, denoted by ur
(
X(t),w(t)
)
, is the total
adoption probability of Hr, i.e., ur
(
X(t),w(t)
)
= 1>n pr(t), where pr(t) is the r-th column vector of P (t).
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Any Nash equilibrium
(
X∗(t),w∗(t)
)
at stage t for the multi-stage game defined above satisfies that, for
any r,
ur
(
X∗(t),w∗(t)
) ≥ ur(X(t),w(t)), (20)
for any
(
X(t),w(t)
) ∈ Ω such that xs(t) = x∗s(t) and ws(t) = w∗s(t) for any s 6= r, and xr(t) 6= x∗r(t) and
wr(t) 6= w∗r(t).
b) Theoretical Analysis of Nash equilibrium and system’s dynamical behavior: The following theorem
gives a closed-form expression of the Nash equilibrium at each stage and the system’s asymptotic behavior
when every player is adopting the policy at the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 17 (Competitive seeding-quality game). Consider the R-player multi-stage game described above
in this subsection. Further assume that the budget limit cr for any company r satisfies
cr > max
{
nγ
1>n (1n −α)
1>nα
, (
n
mini αi
− 1)γ
}
. (21)
Then we have the following conclusions:
i) at each time step t+ 1, the Nash equilibrium
(
X∗(t+ 1),w∗(t+ 1)
)
is given by
x∗ir(t+ 1) =
αi
n
cr +
αiγ
n
1>nβr(t)− βir(t)γ, (22)
w∗r(t+ 1) =
(
1− 1
>
nα
n
)(
cr + 1
>
nβr(t)γ
)
, (23)
and x∗ir(t) > 0, w
∗
r(t) > 0 for any i ∈ V, r ∈ Θ;
ii) if
(
X(t),w(t)
)
=
(
X∗(t),w∗(t)
)
for any t ∈ N and P (0) ∈ SnR(1n), then P (t), for t ≥ 1, is a rank-one
matrix of the form
[
p1(t)1n, p2(t)1n, . . . , pR(t)1n
]
. Moreover, for any r ∈ Θ, as t → ∞, pr(t) converges to
cr/1>Rc exponentially fast with the rate nγ/(1
>
Rc+ nγ).
Proof. Since we only discuss time step t + 1 in this proof, for simplicity of notations and without causing
any confusion, we use xir (wr, x
∗
ir, w
∗
r resp.) for xir(t+ 1) (wr(t+ 1), x
∗
ir(t+ 1), w
∗
r(t+ 1) resp.).
If company r knows the actions of all the other companies at time step t+ 1, i.e., (xs, ws), for any s 6= r,
the optimal response for company r is the solution to the following optimization problem:
minimize
(x,w)∈Ωr
− 1>n pr(t+ 1)
subject to 1>nx+ w − cr ≤ 0.
(24)
Let x˜ir = xir +βir(t)γ and Lr(xr, wr, µr) = −1>n pr(t+1)+µr1>nxr +µrwr−µrcr, for any i ∈ V and r ∈ Θ.
The solution to the optimization problem (24) satisfies
∂Lr
∂xir
= −αi
∑
s 6=r x˜is
(
∑R
s=1 x˜is)
2
+ µr = 0, (25)
∂Lr
∂wr
= −1>n (1n −α)
∑
s 6=r ws
(1>Rw)2
+ µr = 0, (26)
∂Lr
∂µr
= 1>nxr + wr − cr = 0. (27)
According to equation (20), (x∗r , w
∗
r) is the solution to the optimization problem (24) with (xs, ws) =
(x∗s, w
∗
s) for any s 6= r. One immediate result is that 1>nx∗r +w∗r − cr = 0 for any r ∈ Θ. Then, according to
equation (25), we have that, at the Nash equilibrium at time step t+ 1,
1√
µr
=
1∑n
k=1
√
αk
∑
s6=r x˜
∗
ks
R∑
s=1
(
cs − w∗s + 1>nβsγ
)
,
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and therefore, √
αi
∑
s6=r x˜
∗
is
n∑
k=1
√
αk
∑
s6=r
x˜∗ks
=
R∑
s=1
x˜∗is
R∑
s=1
(
cs − w∗s + 1>nβs(t)γ
) . (28)
The right-hand side of the equation above does not depend on the product index r. Therefore,√
αi
∑
s6=r x˜
∗
is∑n
k=1
√
αk
∑
s6=r x˜
∗
ks
=
√
αi
∑
s6=τ x˜
∗
is∑n
k=1
√
αk
∑
s6=τ x˜
∗
ks
,
for any r, τ ∈ Θ. The equation above leads to
∑
s6=r x˜
∗
is∑
s6=τ x˜
∗
is
=
∑nk=1
√
αk
∑
s 6=r x˜
∗
ks∑n
k=1
√
αk
∑
s6=τ x˜
∗
ks
2 .
Since the right-hand side of the equation above does not depend on the individual index i, we have∑
s6=r x˜
∗
is∑
s 6=r x˜
∗
js
=
∑
s6=τ x˜
∗
is∑
s6=τ x˜
∗
js
=
∑R
s=1 x˜
∗
is∑R
s=1 x˜
∗
js
=
x˜∗ir
x˜∗jr
,
for any r, τ ∈ Θ. Combine the equation above with equation (28) and then we obtain∑R
s=1 x˜
∗
is∑R
s=1 x˜
∗
js
=
√
αi
αj
√∑
s 6=r x˜
∗
is∑
s6=r x˜
∗
js
⇒ x˜
∗
ir
x˜∗jr
=
αi
αj
,
for any r ∈ Θ. Therefore,
x˜∗ir =
αi
1>nα
(
cr − w∗r + 1>nβr(t)γ
)
. (29)
Combining equation (29) and (26), we obtain
cr − w∗r + 1>nβr(t)γ
w∗r
=
cτ − w∗τ + 1>nβτ (t)γ
w∗τ
= η,
for any r, τ ∈ Θ and some constant η. Substitute the equation above back into equation (26), we solve
that η = 1>nα/1
>
n (1n − α). Therefore, we obtain equation (23) and by substituting equation (23) into
equation (29) we obtain equation (22). Moreover, one can check that equation (21) guarantees x˜∗ir > 0 and
w∗r > 0 for any i ∈ V and r ∈ Θ. This concludes the proof for Conclusion i).
Substituting euqation (22) and (23) into the dynamical system (19), after simplification, we have
pr(t+ 1) =
cr + 1>n A˜pr(t)γ
1>Rc+ nγ
1n = pr(t+ 1)1n.
Therefore, pr(t+ 1) =
(
cr +nγpr(t)
)
/(1>Rc+nγ) for any t ≥ 1. One can check that the equation above leads
to all the results in Conclusion ii).
c) Interpretations and Remarks: The basic idea of seeding-quality trade-off in the competitive seeding-
quality game is similar to the work by Fazeli et. al. [14] but our model is essentially different from [14] in
that our model is multi-stage, and takes the products, rather than the individuals, as the players. Moreover,
our model is based on a different network propagation dynamics.
Theorem 17 provides some strategic insights on the investment decisions and the seeding-quality trade-off.
c.1) Interpretation of βir(t): By definition, βir(t) is the average probability, among all the neighbors of
individual i, of adopting product Hr at time step t, while 1>nβr(t)/n =
∑n
l=1
∑n
k=1 a˜lkβkr(t)/n is a convext
combination of all the entries of βr(t) and characterizes the current overall acceptance of product Hr.
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c.2) Seeding-quality trade-off: According to equation (23), at the Nash equilibrium, the investment on
Hr’s product quality monotonically decreases with 1>nα/n, and increases with 1
>
nβr. This observation
implies that: 1) in a society with relatively low open-mindedness, the competing companies should relatively
emphasize more on improving their products’ quality, rather than seeding, and vice versa; 2) for products
which are currently not widely adopted, seeding is relatively more efficient than improving the product’s
quality.
c.3) Allocation of seeding resources among the individuals: According to equation (22), for any company
r, at the Nash equilibrium at each time step t + 1, the investment on seeding for any individual i, i.e.,
xir(t+1), increases with individual i’s open-mindedness, since it is easier for a more open-minded individual
to be influence by seeding. Moreover, if we rewrite equation (22) as
x∗ir(t+ 1) =
αi
n
cr +
αiγ
n
∑
k 6=i
βkr(t)− (1− αi
n
)γβir(t),
one would observe that x∗ir(t) monotonically decreases with βir(t), which denotes the average probability of
adopting Hr among individual i’s neighbors. A possible explanation is that, with large βir(t), individual i is
very likely to be converted to Hr due to her neighbors, and thereby the seeding for individual i is relatively
not necessary. Once again we rewrite equation (22) as
x∗ir(t+ 1) =
αi
n
cr +
αiγ
n
n∑
l=1
a˜lipir(t)
+
αiγ
n
n∑
l=1
∑
k 6=i
a˜lkpkl(t)− γ
n∑
k=1
a˜ikpkr(t).
On the right-hand side of the equation above, only the second term contains pir(t). Therefore, x
∗
ir(t) increases
with
∑n
l=1 a˜lipir(t), in which
∑n
l=1 a˜li is individual i’s in-degree, reflecting i’s potential of influencing the
others, and
∑n
l=1 a˜lipir(t) characterizes individual i’s potential of converting other individuals to product
Hr.
c.4) Nash equilibrium on the boundary: Without equation (21), the right-hand sides of equation (22)
and (23) could be non-positive. In this case, the analysis becomes more complicated and the Nash equilibrium
would be on the boundary of Ω, i.e., some of the x∗ir(t) or w
∗
r(t) should be 0.
c.5 Preset quality: In order to make the quality function gr(w) smooth at w = 0R, we can modify its
definition as gr(w; ξ, u) = (wr + ξru)/(1TRw + u), where u > 0 and xi  0R are model parameters and
1TRξ = 1. The parameter ξr characterizes product Hr’s preset relative quality. Based on the same argument
of the proof for Theorem 17, one can check that, for the Nash equilibrium at which all the individuals’
investments on both seeding and quality are positive, w∗r(t+1)+u1
>
nαξr/n is equal to the right-hand side of
equation (23) and thereby any company r’s investment on quality decreases with Hr’s preset relative quality.
5.2 Model 2: competitive seeding game
In this subsection we consider the case when the products’ relative quality is fixed and the competing
companies can only invest on seeding. The model set-up is the same with the game proposed in Section
V.A, except that the action for any company r is xr ∈ Rn×1≥0 , constrained by 1>nxr ≤ cr. The dynamics of
P (t) =
(
pir(t)
)
n×R, with seeding actions X(t), is given by
pir(t+ 1) = αi
γβir(t) + xir(t)
x(i)(t)1R + γ
+ (1− αi)
R∑
s=1
pis(t)δsr.
(30)
The following theorem gives the closed-form expression of the unique Nash equilibrium at each time step
and the system’s dynamical behavior if all the companies are adopting the policies at the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 18 (Competitive propagation game with seeding only). Consider the competitive seeding game
described in this subsection. Assume that cr > (1>nα/mini αi − 1)γ for any r ∈ Θ. Then we have:
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i) at each time step, the Nash equilibrium X∗(t) is given by
x∗r(t) =
cr + 1>nβr(t)γ
1>nα
α− γβr(t),
and x∗r(t)  0n, for any r ∈ Θ;
ii) if X(t) = X∗(t) for any t ∈ N, then the matrix form of system (30) is given by
P (t+ 1) = diag(α)
1nc> + γ(1n1>n )A˜P (t)
1>n c+ nγ
+ (I − diag(α))P (t)∆.
(31)
Moreover, there exists a unique fixed point P ∗ ∈ SnR(1n) for the system above, and, for any P (0) ∈ SnR(1n),
P (t) converges to P ∗ exponentially fast with the convergence rate η = maxi αinγ/(1>n c+nγ) + (1−αi)ζ(∆),
where 0 ≤ ζ(∆) = 1−∑Rr=1 mins δsr ≤ 1.
Proof of Conclusion i) in Theorem 18 is similar to the proof of Conclusion i) in Theorem 17. As for
Conclusion ii) in Theorem 18, following the same line of argument in the proof of Case 1 in Theorem 7 and
applying the Banach fixed point theorem, one can check that equation (31) defines a contraction map.
Interpretations on the allocation of seeding investments among the individuals, for the competitive
seeding-quality game proposed in the previous subsection, also applies to the competitive seeding game
proposed in this subsection. One main difference in dynamical property between these two game-theoretic
models is that, in the competitive seeding game defined in Section V.B, the matrix P (t) does not become a
rank-one matrix with all the players adopting the policies at the Nash equilibrium, and moreover, the fixed
point P ∗ for system (31) depends not only on the budgets vector c, but also on α and A˜.
5.3 Simulation illustration
Simulation work has been conducted for the two game-theoretic models analyzed in this section, on a
competitive propagation system with R = 2, n = 5 and A˜ being strongly connected. The model parameters
are set as α = (0.8, 0.85, 0.75, 0.84, 0.76)>, γ = 100, c1 = 600, c2 = 900, such that the conditions on cr in
Theorem 17 and 18 are satisfied. For the competitive seeding game, ∆ is randomly generated. Figure 9(a)
shows that, for the competitive seeding-quality game, the average probability of adopting H1 (H2 resp.)
converges to c1/(c1 + c2) (c2/(c1 + c2) resp.), as predicted by Theorem 17. In addition, Figure 9(b) shows
that, for the competitive seeding game, the average probability of adopting H1 (or H2 resp.) also converges.
Moreover, one can observe, from both Figure 9(a) and 9(b), that the company adopting the Nash policy,
with the other company just randomly allocating the investment, has higher pay-off than in the case in which
both sides are adopting the policies at the Nash equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
This paper discusses a class of competitive propagation models based on two product-adoption mechanisms:
the social conversion and the self conversion. Applying the independence approximation we propose two
difference equations systems, referred to as the social-self NCPM and the self-social NCPM respectively.
Theoretical analysis reveals that the structure of the product-conversion graph plays an important role
in determining the nodes’ asymptotic state probability distributions. Simulation results reveal the high
accuracy of the independence approximation and the asymptotic behavior of the original social-self Markov
chain model. Based on the social-self NCPM, we propose a class of multi-stage competitive propagation
games and discuss the trade-off between seeding and quality at the unique Nash equilibrium. One possible
future work is the deliberative investigation on the Nash equilibrium on the boundary. Another open problem
is the stability analysis of the self-social NCPM with R > 2. Simulation results support the claim that, for
the self-social NCPM with R > 2, there also exists a unique fixed point P ∗ and, for any initial condition
P (0) ∈ SnR(1n), the solution P (t) to equation (10) converges to P ∗. We leave this statement as a conjecture.
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(a) competitive seeding-quality game (b) competitive seeding game
Figure 9: Evolution of the average adoption probabilities 1>n pr(t)/n for the two game models proposed in
Section V. The solid curves represent the average adoption probability for product H1, while the dash curves
represents the average adoption probability for product H2. The blue curves correspond to the case in which
both companies are adopting the Nash policies, while the red curves correspond to the case when company
1 is adopting the Nash policy but company 2 is randomly allocating the investment on seeding and product
quality.
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